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Valuation is in the Eye of the Beholder

The structure of sports leagues in the United States differs from those seen elsewhere in the world. Most importantly, American sports teams compete annually against pretty much the same opposition. The composition of leagues such as the NFL or NBA is largely static, with new franchises entering only rarely and with the agreement of the owners of other teams. The same holds true for various minor leagues, which operate in conjunction with the largest professional leagues, but whose teams don’t move between levels of the sport.

In UK soccer, the sport with which I am involved, in contrast, the league is composed of linked divisions arranged in a hierarchy where membership of each division changes at the end of every season—based on merit, so that the top few teams in each division move up in the hierarchy, and the bottom few clubs move down. The drama around the joy of promotion to a higher division and the misery of relegation to a lower one is part of what makes the sport so compelling; for fans (and owners) of clubs involved in the battle to win one or avoid the other, the chase can be both thrilling and terrifying.

Another significant difference, particularly in soccer, is that the frequency with which players are traded is much greater than that in most American sports. Trading of players (technically, of their contracts) takes place in two transfer windows, a long one that starts before the season begins and stays open until the season is a month old, and a short one in the middle of the season—the month of January.

Players are, of course, any club’s biggest asset, and once assets start being traded, any investment person will wonder what determines the price of those assets and how that market price relates to “true” value of the asset.

In investing, practitioners have a model that claims the value of an asset is the value of the cash flows it generates in the future, discounted back to a present value using a discount rate that is the sum of a risk-free interest rate and an equity risk premium. We all accept that the model is imperfect, but investors such as us believe that prices are more volatile than values and that they converge on value over some indeterminate time frame. Over short periods prices are set by the preponderance of buyers and sellers, but eventually, underlying values dominate prices. As Ben Graham observed, “In the short run, the market is a voting machine but in the long run, it is a weighing machine.”

There is no such model that underlies prices in the market for soccer players (and I apologize to all players for considering them only as tradeable assets in this piece. They are, of course, human beings and, unlike stocks that are indifferent to ownership, have preferences about where and for whom they play). The result is that prices for soccer players are driven by the quantity of money available in the industry and often appear to have little basis in the value that is created by that player on the field (or pitch). Buyers have been attracted to rising prices for soccer clubs and more money has entered the industry in recent years, leading to a rapid increase in the price for an average player.

Prices for clubs similarly appear unrelated to their value. The discounted present value of cash flows generated by clubs in the division in which my club plays is strongly negative, with the average club losing over £25 million a year, sometimes on revenues that are less than the losses. Owners should pay to have these liabilities taken off their hands. (I hasten to add that my club operates on a cash flow breakeven basis, but still doesn’t generate cash flows that could accrue to its shareholders).

Instead, prices of clubs and players are determined, as is often the case in the real estate market, by “comparables”—buyers and sellers look at prices of similar assets and negotiate based on that. In an industry where money has been available in increasing amounts, but the numbers of clubs and players roughly fixed, that has led, unsurprisingly, to price inflation.

At my club Plymouth Argyle, we have embarked on a strategy to try to generate returns from player trading. We allocated some funds last year to buy players with the intention that they would increase in price and then be sold, generating profits to be reinvested or used to pay higher wages for more skillful players—establishing a portfolio of players, if you will. As part of that effort, we have thought about a model to determine value in the absence of associated cash flows. We could, for example, say that promotion to a higher division would increase the club’s revenues by £x million, and that an individual player could increase the probability of capturing those revenues by y%. That is possible, if not easy, and enables us to put an expected value on an individual player. The trouble is that the resulting number bears little relation to the actual market prices for players, coming up with a value that’s significantly less than actual market prices! We could also accept that the market for clubs is what it is, and that prices for clubs rise as they ascend the league’s divisions so base the expected value for a player on the contribution he makes to the probability of promotion and the value of that promotion, or to avoiding relegation. Again, this is not a true anchor in value, simply in prices for clubs.

This is, of course, quite different from investing in stocks, where, as I’ve pointed out, prices, in the long run, are determined by underlying value.

But how firm is that underpinning? Is it really so much more objective and calculable than the trading of sports stars? Investment professionals, and finance academics, like to talk about the “intrinsic value” of a stock, once the analysis has been done, the forecasts made, and the discount rate applied.

But is there really an intrinsic value that is separate from the preferences of the valuer? As my colleague Andrew West has written, “Valuation is always an estimate, and valuation always requires a valuer.”

The forecasts that analysts make of cash flows far into the future reflect subjective views about that future—not just about management’s ability to control costs, impose higher prices, gain market share or invest retained earnings successfully, but also about competitive positions in the industry in which the company operates and the industry’s competitive structure and growth rates. And all that occurs before the analyst considers the economic environment in which the company operates.

The choice of discount rates presents further opportunities for subjectivity. The risk-free rate is observable in the US Treasury market (though which Treasury should be used to approximate rates in the future is debatable) but the equity risk premium is highly contentious and perhaps is best described in terms of individual risk and return preferences and needs. In my career I’ve heard perfectly sensible people argue that the equity risk premium should be zero, and others argue that it should be 600 basis points.

Value is in the eye of the beholder and an estimate of true value is closer to an estimate of what the market is prepared to pay than fundamental investors such as us like to admit. In thinking about stock portfolios, as in thinking about the value of a squad of footballers, we cannot ignore what the market is prepared to pay when thinking about portfolio construction and even about long-term returns.

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Stock Portfolios, Football Teams, and the Stories We Tell Ourselves about Each

The world is complex and unpredictable, but humans prefer order, and cause and effect, so therefore tell stories that purport to explain what is simply random. Narratives pre-date writing. They help make events coherent and memorable, while arousing emotions in the listener. Behavioral biases, which all humans share, are in many cases essentially products of the stories we tell ourselves. The more detailed the story, the more entertaining it is and the more powerfully it can affect our emotions. We love stories. That can often be wonderful, but in decision making it can be dangerous.

In investing, there has been at least a little progress towards improving decision making by resisting the power of stories. Quantitative investors describe how they adhere to purely objective rules (rules and lines of code that, of course, they themselves have written) to govern their behavior and reduce bias. “Quantamentalists,” another breed of investor, allow some judgement to enter their decision making once they have established the framework. They do this in part in recognition that, as a rule, most humans don’t like rules. We suffer from what psychologists call “algorithm aversion,” i.e. preferring to go with our gut. That preference results from our need to remain in control, or at least to believe we are. Permitting human override of an algorithm may degrade the quality of its output, but in granting themselves the comfort of exercising some degree of control, decision makers likely improve their rate of adherence, for an overall improvement in outcomes. I fully expect self-driving cars to come with a steering wheel that will have no impact on direction of travel, but will allow the human passenger to feel more secure than if she were simply sitting back and giving herself over fully to the computer under the hood.

In his book The Success Equation, Michael Mauboussin writes extensively about the importance of a strong process and rules in activities where the immediate outcome is driven by luck and skill. He describes how it is possible to improve skill through what has become known as deliberate practice: repetitive, purposeful, and systematic repetition with immediate and specific feedback. Luck, however, can only be managed by having a strong process, with rules or standards constraining decision making and the urge to impute too much importance to our role in any one result. In activities such as investing or team sports—arenas where skill and luck both come into play—narrative is particularly seductive, making adherence to this recipe for success a constant battle.

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Culture Club

In sports, dynasties like the American football Packers of the 1960s, the New Zealand All Blacks national rugby squad, and basketball’s San Antonio Spurs have demonstrated the power of culture to bind individuals together and enable a team to produce results above what could be expected by simply adding up the expected contributions of each member. The business world has tried to produce similar results; although exactly what culture is remains poorly defined, the hundreds of jobs available on LinkedIn seeking an individual to oversee a company’s culture certainly attest to its importance. I’ve been fortunate to have a front row seat at an investment firm (Harding Loevner) known for its strong culture and, more recently, at a UK football club (Plymouth Argyle) that is trying to develop a culture that will strengthen the organization behind the team on the pitch. As is frequently the case because of my dual roles, the parallels between the two industries and the two organizations are very much on my mind.

There are many similarities between cultures at football clubs and investment organizations, despite the underlying processes required by their core activities—making decisions on the pitch about how to try and score and defend or making decisions about buying and selling securities—being very different.

In both industries, the goal is for the team to be greater than the sum of its parts. On the pitch, an individual must rely on teammates, but certainly not debate or challenge them. Rather, coaches teach decision making so that, like muscle memory, it is instantaneous and requires little active thought.

At Harding Loevner, rules and processes constrain decision making to prevent it from being dominated by cognitive biases. Colleagues think for themselves but must expose their ideas to challenge. This is the core of our investment culture—what we call “collaboration without consensus.” We believe that one of the most difficult biases to overcome in conducting research is the tendency to give precedence to evidence that confirms our beliefs and to ignore evidence that challenges them. So, it is important that our ideas be continuously exposed to challenge. However, this leads to other problems. Humans, as social beings, generally don’t like disagreement; they are literally fearful of it. That’s why an important part of a culture of collaboration without consensus is that it be enabled by both transparency and the value of tolerance. We strive to sustain an environment in which colleagues do not feel threatened by disagreement and recognize that challenges—while discomfiting—are essential for good decision making.

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Don’t Just Do Something—Stand There

Humans prefer to do something rather than nothing. We like office environments that are a “hive of activity” and commend “men of action.” When stuck in a traffic jam, we will take an alternate route just to keep moving, even if it prolongs the journey. We tend, though, to conflate activity with productivity, mistaking the people whom we see doing the most with those who are the most valuable.

We see this bias in many domains. Our political leaders tend to respond to a crisis with ill-considered policies that capture attention but often do little good and may even do harm. It would be unacceptable for them to stand by and simply do nothing. While serving as both vice chairman of Harding Loevner and as chairman of a professional soccer club that competes in the English Football League (EFL), I have been struck by the parallels between investing and sports when it comes to the biases that damage effective decision-making. Studies have looked at penalty kicks in soccer. When a penalty is awarded, the ball is placed 12 yards from the center of the goal and a kicker gets the opportunity to score with only the goalkeeper standing in the way. It turns out that because of the goalkeeper’s bias for action, the optimal place to kick the ball is directly at the center of the goal. A goalkeeper will almost always dive one way or another in anticipation. If he dives the wrong way, he’s forgiven as having simply guessed wrong, or as being sent the wrong way by the kicker’s supposed feint. If he dives the right way, he has a chance to stop the ball entering the goal. If he merely stands in the middle, however, he is the subject of much abuse for doing nothing.

Investors fall victim to similar pressures and impulses. The immediate costs of transacting are low, and the propensity to transact is high. The result is that investors transact too much, and their returns suffer. They tend to transact at the wrong time, buying after prices have risen, and selling after prices have fallen.

Underlying these behaviors is a general misunderstanding of the roles of luck and skill. In sports and in investing, short-term results are the outcome of a combination of the two. Yet, we tend both to attribute the outcome more to skill than to luck and to extrapolate a series of outcomes (good or bad) into the future. This tendency stems from our deep-seated need for explanation, and a need to feel we are in control even when we are not. This occurs particularly in those sports, like soccer, that are generally low-scoring affairs. Unlike in basketball, for example, where there will be more than a hundred points in a game, the average number of goals in a professional soccer game is roughly three. The result of a single game will largely be driven by luck—one bobble of the ball, the inches between hitting a goalpost and scoring, a poor refereeing decision. Yet the narrative in post-match interviews is seldom “we got lucky.” At least, it’s seldom the case that “we got lucky” when the interviewee’s team wins. When the team loses, the loss is the result of bad luck! How similar this is to investment narratives, where there seems to be only two kinds of investment managers: the talented, and the unlucky.