Macro Do’s and Don’ts

By Edmund Bellord, Analyst and Portfolio Manager and Simon Hallett, Vice Chairman | October 19, 2022

This commentary is excerpted from the Harding Loevner Third Quarter 2022 International Report.

One of our more acid-tongued colleagues likes to observe that “just because we don’t do macro, it doesn’t mean the macro cannot do us.” The observation is a challenge to our bottom-up investment philosophy and merits a response. What does his comment really mean? Is he correct?

By “not doing macro,” he means that we try not to allow our judgments about macroeconomic variables—GDP growth, inflation, and real interest rates—or geopolitical events to dictate our views on individual companies. By “macro does us,” he means that when the market’s risk tolerance and underlying assumptions change because of unexpected shifts in the macroeconomic environment, the consequential price movements can dominate a portfolio’s periodic absolute and relative returns. Although the injury may be only temporary, it is hard to avoid getting swept up in the general fervor. That’s a problem if it leads to reflexive and hasty reactions. It is precisely to avoid getting whipsawed in this way that we devote much of our efforts to restraining our inherent behavioral biases. But even with the sturdiest of behavioral guardrails designed to curb our responsiveness, the sudden jump in portfolio volatility and tracking error feels no less jarring.

Our investment approach centers on analysis of the prospects for specific companies and the industries in which they operate. As a result, the portfolios we construct are a mosaic of company-centric views, with the final picture coming into focus only after all of the pieces are assembled. Sometimes our bottom-up investment process leads us to sidestep systemic issues. In the years before the global financial crisis, for instance, we became disenchanted with the traditional banking industry. We didn’t like how the increased price transparency that came with the migration of services online diminished banks’ bargaining power over their borrowers and depositors, or how rising levels of consumer debt portended that growth could be weaker, and rivalry and risk-taking fiercer. That was enough to lead us largely to steer clear of banking stocks. Although in hindsight our portfolio positioning appeared to anticipate the subsequent dislocations, in fact we had no overarching view on systemic financial stability.

There is no question it would be nice to have clear foresight on GDP, inflation, and real rates. Like it or not, economic growth is the lifeblood of industrial economies, and, despite its ever-shifting relationship to equity returns, is closely associated with aggregate earnings. Similarly, inflation and real rates are both barometers and agents of economic transformation that always could and frequently do alter the path of economic growth. And there is strong reason to believe that macro-level dislocations are likely to be an order of magnitude greater than the mispricings that occur at the security level. Given the periodic importance of such dislocations, this raises the question: Why don’t we attempt to shape our portfolios more explicitly by directly forecasting economic variables or geopolitical events? The question is particularly vexing given the current importance of the inflation outlook for equities.

Tetlock’s conclusion was that expert predictions about geopolitical crises were no better than guesses. The only contribution that expertise seemed consistently to confer was a perverse boost in confidence regarding one’s (ineffective) forecasts.

The standard response typically trotted out is that forecasting is exceptionally hard, or as the Danish physicist Niels Bohr is alleged to have quipped, “Prediction is very difficult, especially about the future.” Nowhere is this more true than with geopolitical events, which by all accounts appear to defy anyone’s ability to anticipate them with anything approaching consistency. The political scientist Philip Tetlock tackled this issue head-on in a multidecade study described in his 2015 book, Superforecasting: The Art and Science of Prediction. Tetlock’s conclusion was that expert predictions about geopolitical crises were no better than guesses. What’s more, the only contribution that expertise seemed consistently to confer was a perverse boost in confidence regarding one’s (ineffective) forecasts.

The record for macroeconomic forecasting is not quite as wretched; at least there are frameworks and models on which to hang one’s thinking. But it’s still one of those endeavors where you’re doing very well if you’re right a little more often than you’re wrong. Even so, it is not as though the ground-level forecasting of cashflows, business prospects, and competitive forces is easy. So perhaps the real question is why we consider the latter sensible but the former a fool’s errand, at least for fundamental equity investors such as us.

The answer in large part comes down to the size of the opportunity set, or the number of times you get to apply your investing edge. Even the most skilled forecasters, whatever their forecasting game, have but the tiniest of edges and so the surest way to increase their chances of success is to apply that minute edge as many times as possible. In a global investment universe, there are roughly 8,000 equity securities, each operating in its own industry and geography with their own sets of return drivers, compared with a relative handful of forecastable macroeconomic variables. Given equal forecasting skill, you are going to have a far higher likelihood of some overall success by applying that skill across many securities rather than over a few economic statistics. Even allowing for the fact that not every security’s return is entirely idiosyncratic, there are still far more independent and durable drivers of individual security returns than there are of macroeconomic trends, which may allow you to get the micro right without so much as taking a swing at the macro.

Even if you were one of the few hyper-skilled and hyper-accurate macro forecasters, a portfolio of stocks would be a poor way to capitalize on views about inflation or economic growth. Although there’s a relationship between the macroeconomy and stock returns, that relationship is neither simple nor determinate. In practical terms, stocks are a terribly inefficient way to express a view on macroeconomic variables. Better to bet on currencies, yields curves, and commodity prices directly, all of which are far more closely tethered to the outlook for growth, inflation, and real rates.

It’s not just that there are better, more precise, and more levered ways to express macroeconomic views. It’s also that trying to do so with stocks risks erasing the hard-won company-level insights that are the linchpin of our portfolios.

And it’s not just that there are better, more precise, and more levered ways to express such views. It’s also that trying to do so with stocks risks erasing the hard-won company-level insights that are the linchpin of our portfolios. All the companies in which we invest have track records of successfully generating cash and reinvesting it wisely. In many cases these companies have survived wars, recessions, pandemics, inflation, deflation, and geopolitical shocks. Sacrificing those financially valuable fundamental attributes in a most likely vain attempt to time a particular economic cycle not only presupposes a preternatural ability to tie economic outcomes to individual security returns but also risks the long-term health of the portfolio.

We don’t do macro, so by default we allow macro to do us. There are, though, ways in which we can protect against developments that result in sudden changes in risk aversion. One is to diversify—events that damage the outlook in one industry or part of the world may have no impact, or even a beneficial one, on stock prices elsewhere. That said, diversification cannot work during times of systemic crisis, when correlations between geographies, industries, sectors, and individual securities converge. That’s where our reliance on a company’s strength comes in. Two hallmarks of a company’s quality are the ability of its management to prepare for a wide range of outcomes and whether it has the financial strength to survive the worst possible operating conditions.

Although we can’t estimate the probability of market-moving events, we can think about the magnitude and range of potential outcomes so we may more fully understand our exposures and ensure we are sufficiently diversified to protect against them. For example, before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, many people thought about a range of outcomes that included war versus no war or disruption to energy supplies. But, given prior Western responses, few considered the potential for sanctions that would freeze all Russian assets and render them worthless, at least for the time being. Now, as we think about the financial market implications if China were to invade Taiwan, we must consider the possibility that Chinese assets could be similarly impaired.

So, what do we do about it? We certainly aren’t going to try to parse Chinese troop movements or overturn our investment theses on the dozens of companies, not only in China but also throughout the global supply chain, that could be impacted by what at this point must still be considered a very low-probability event. On the other hand, thinking long and hard about the potential risks to supply lines, revenues, or the corporate structures of portfolio companies and what further levels of diversification might be in order is very much in our wheelhouse.

What did you think of this piece?

A Ground’s Eye View on Inflation and Its Persistence

By Edmund Bellord, Analyst and Portfolio Manager | December 16, 2021

The pandemic sowed the seeds of today’s inflation. That much is clear. Last year, fear and government-mandated lockdowns sparked a global recession. Businesses rushed to cut production ahead of an anticipated slowdown in consumption, or were hobbled by forced plant closings, anxious workers, or snarled logistics. But the sheer sweep of the income support in many developed countries meant that household incomes didn’t fall nearly as far as had been expected based on the rise in unemployment. Unable to spend on services like eating out and travel, consumers flush with cash turned to buying, or attempting to buy, big-ticket goods and better houses.

The outsized demand for durable goods has run headlong into the diminished supply. While the springboard for price increases may have been reduced supply, the strength and persistence of those increases, which are now feeding through to labor markets, are raising the specter that aggregate demand is outpacing even normalized aggregate supply. There is precious little that monetary policy can do to counter supply-led inflation, but—Omicron willing—it is likely to be temporary. But if inflation comes to be led by stubborn excess demand, then tight monetary policy is the orthodox response, and we can expect central banks to hit the economy over the head with a brick to prevent a sustained wage-price spiral. Demand-led inflation would have significant implications for asset prices.

Inflation is notoriously difficult to forecast; even some at the US Federal Reserve (Fed) concede that it has no working model for inflation.¹ We could do no better and accordingly make no effort to forecast future inflation. What we can do is talk to the companies we own or follow and tease out the impact on their earnings from the rising input costs they’re experiencing; their changing bargaining power vis à vis their suppliers; whether they are able to pass on higher costs to their customers before stifling demand; and how all that is coloring their business outlook. The following represents what our research analysts have been able to glean from those conversations.

Price Makers vs. Takers

As a rule, companies whose products are more specialized are in the best position to pass increased production costs onto their customers. The difference in how such price “makers” and price “takers,” whose products are less differentiated, manage inflationary pressures can be dramatic, even within the same industry. This is illustrated in the diverging responses of Elanco and Zoetis, two US-based animal health companies. Both have been proactive in their response to rising input costs, but Elanco decided to protect its margins mainly through cost savings by eliminating 380 upper- and middle-level management positions. Zoetis, with a portfolio of unique medicines and vaccines, was able to increase its prices enough that the adjustments helped expand its gross margin by 110 bps despite higher costs.

NITORI, a Japanese retailer of imported furniture and one of the largest users of containers destined for Japan, was forced to charter an entire ship to guarantee inventory for its stores.

Some differences in taking and making, however, are more structural in nature. In something of a departure from past cycles, developed economies have generally seen higher inflation than emerging economies, with the US seeing the highest. The one big exception to the inflationary trend in developed countries has been Japan, where inflation has actually fallen. Japanese consumers are resistant to price increases after experiencing decades of low growth and falling prices. What this means is that input price increases tend to be absorbed by the companies in the production and distribution chain, putting downward pressure on their margins. Importers have taken it especially hard on the chin from rising freight costs and the fall in the yen. NITORI, a Japanese retailer of imported furniture and one of the largest users of containers destined for Japan, was forced to charter an entire ship to guarantee inventory for its stores. For exporters with domestic operations, on the other hand, the fall in the yen has offset some of the climb in input costs. Companies as diverse as machine-vision leader Keyence; factory-automation equipment producer MISUMI Group; Rinnai, a manufacturer of energy-efficient tankless water heaters; and Unicharm, a maker of diapers and feminine hygiene products, are all reporting sales or profits that have exceeded their pre-pandemic levels.

Around the Sectors

Given the shipping bottlenecks and the increase in energy prices over the past year, transportation costs have soared around the world. According to the Cass Freight Index, freight costs in the US increased by 37% in October 2021 year over year. Canadian National Railways (CNR), which operates rail freight across North America, saw its costs per unit of volume increase by 15% in third quarter 2021 alone, with almost all the increase due to the hike in fuel costs. So far, CNR has been able to offset two-thirds of the increase by raising prices.

Some of the same factors hurting transportation companies and their customers have benefitted producers of raw materials, where selling prices have risen faster than input costs. This is true for two of the mining companies we follow, Rio Tinto and Vale, which are among the lowest-cost producers in their segments. Meanwhile, in the oil industry, exploration and production as well as integrated energy firms are cautious about the oil-price recovery after the drubbing they took over the previous six years and are holding the line on capital expenditures for expansion.

Among industrial firms, most seem to be passing through higher commodity prices in some form, but only those with the strongest pricing power have passed them on in full. For instance, 3M, producer of a vast variety of specialized and less-differentiated products, raised its prices by 1.4% on average in the third quarter—but, after accounting for the rising cost of raw materials, its margins still declined by 1.3%. On the other hand, Ametek, a US-based global maker of electronic instruments, expanded its margins, even while acknowledging the challenges of higher raw-material prices and supply-chain issues.

In China, where domestic consumption remains hostage to the government’s zero-COVID policy, rising factory-gate prices have generally not translated into much higher prices for consumers. Nevertheless, pockets of pricing power exist. Nearly all of home-appliance manufacturer Haier’s revenue growth in China this year has been from pricing, partly as some consumers trade up to higher-end offerings. Sanhua Intelligent Controls, a manufacturer of thermal management systems for the HVAC and automotive industries, has automatically passed through most cost increases for its appliance parts, where its bargaining power is strongest, and is negotiating them for other products. The voracious demand for electric vehicles is insulating CATL, a leading producer of lithium-ion batteries. Not only was it able to raise prices; it has also used its bargaining power over its suppliers to control input costs and further increase its margins. Even CATL’s smaller rival BYD was able to raise the price of its batteries by 20% or more just last month.

Within Information Technology, semiconductor prices have continued to climb due to the inability of manufacturing capacity to keep up with exploding electronics demand: the “chip shortage” that was one of the earliest inflationary triggers, and is ongoing, as significant capital expenditures take time to turn into capacity additions. Most foundries that manufacture the chips used in automotive and industrial applications have already pushed two, sometimes even three, rounds of price increases this year, and they believe the pattern is set to continue into 2022. Demand for leading-edge semiconductors produced by Samsung and TSMC has been more stable, resulting in only modest price increases. Semiconductor tool makers have seen small improvements in their gross margins, but nothing compared to the 10% jump seen for some of the foundries. The consensus view in the industry is that the hikes in chip prices that have occurred are sticky and will not revert after supply normalizes.

The area where cost inflation seems most acute is among retailers and consumer goods manufacturers, most of whom are facing unprecedented increases in labor and input costs, as well as supply-chain problems. Couche-Tard, the Canada-based gas station convenience store operator behind the Circle K brand, has overhauled its recruitment and retention policies, adding bonuses and more training to cope with the labor shortage. The company estimates almost one-third of its 7.7% increase in operating expenses is due to increased labor costs. Multinational consumer goods manufacturers, which have more flexibility to reallocate production to manage labor shortages in given locales, have fared better, and several have noted that consumers appear more willing to accept higher prices than they have in the past. Procter & Gamble has increased prices in 90% of its core product categories without seeing a falloff in demand, a trend also echoed by Colgate-Palmolive and Unilever.

Looking Ahead

Presently bond markets are anticipating that central banks will soon bring the inflationary pressures under control. Low real long-term rates, low forward-inflation expectations, and flat yield curves are all indications that, despite raging inflation today, investors believe that central banks will act firmly to raise short-term interest rates, pre-empting the need for more aggressive tightening later. But the seemingly rock-solid confidence in central banks could be eroded if prices continue to rise unabated. If that point were reached, richly valued equities would likely fall victim to central banks’ imperative to restore their inflation-fighting bona fides.

With annual inflation in the US hitting a 40-year high, the Fed has already indicated it will wind down its asset purchasing program by March 2022 instead of June. More clarity about the first of a series of short-term rate hikes will be next, with the market expecting three hikes over the course of 2022. Will that do the trick? We come back to what we hear from companies. For what it’s worth, while many consumer goods companies expect prices to trend higher into 2022, some of them believe that the rate of increase will reach its zenith in the first half. Some, such as Couche-Tarde, L’Oréal, Compass Group, and Costco Wholesale, are already seeing signs of stabilization. L’Oréal’s management has even gone so far as to suggest that deflation may be a risk if supply chains over-correct for today’s shortages.

Endnotes

¹“The substantive point is that we do not, at present, have a theory of inflation dynamics that works sufficiently well to be of use for the business of real-time monetary policymaking.” (Former Federal Reserve Governor Daniel Tarullo speaking at the Brookings Institute, October 4, 2017.)

What did you think of this piece?

Russia, Risk, and Decision-Making

By Simon Hallett, Vice Chairman | March 21, 2022

Our portfolio results have suffered from the impact of Russia’s war with Ukraine that began on February 24 and from the sanctions exerted on Russia by the Western powers. On the eve of the invasion, our Emerging Markets (EM) Equity strategy owned four Russian stocks representing 8% of the portfolio, and our International Equity strategy owned two of those representing just over 2%. As I write this, trading has been halted in Russian securities, and we have assigned all our Russian holdings, for now, a carrying value of zero.

While ours certainly is not the only firm to have been caught out by Russian exposure, and the past few months of rising inflation and interest rate fears have in some ways brought even bigger headaches for our quality-growth investing style, the Russia losses were still “a gut punch,” as a colleague recently told NPR. And we have been asking ourselves, what did we get wrong, and debating what could have been predicted.

The answer to the question “Could we have predicted this outcome?” is, of course, “Yes.” Hindsight makes for extremely accurate forecasts. More importantly, though, are we asking the right question by focusing on the outcome, rather than on the process by which our decisions to invest in Russian securities were made? When making decisions under conditions of uncertainty, it is not just probable, but certain, that you will sometimes be wrong. If we were to judge the quality of our decisions solely on outcomes, it would be, as former Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin once said, “a serious deterrent to taking the risks that may be necessary to making the right decision. Simply put, the way decisions are evaluated affects the way they are made.”¹

Author, cognitive psychologist, and champion poker player Annie Duke calls assessing decisions based solely on outcomes where those outcomes are a combination of luck and skill “resulting.” In supposing we made a “bad” decision to invest in Russian securities, are we guilty of resulting? Is there evidence, beyond the outcome, to suggest that the decision represents a failure of our investment process?

Author, cognitive psychologist, and champion poker player Annie Duke calls assessing decisions based solely on outcomes where those outcomes are a combination of luck and skill “resulting.”

That process is structured to reflect our investment beliefs. Those beliefs include the idea that securities markets are inefficient, but only mildly so, and that those inefficiencies stem, in large part, from flaws in investor behavior—from cognitive biases. Those biases include:

An underestimation of the power of compounding and a reluctance to take a long-term approach to investment. Rather, investors tend to suffer from a bias toward action over inaction—a bias exploited by the financial media, which gain viewers with a constant barrage of enticement to action, and by financial services companies whose revenues depend on transactions.
A tendency to extrapolate recent results into the future. As a result, stocks of companies with good results become overpriced and of those with bad results underpriced.
A love of stories and narratives in preference to facts, with the consequent overpricing of high-risk investments and underpricing of relative stability—resulting in a return premium to dullness.
Confusion of luck and skill. In activities such as sports, poker, and investing that combine luck and skill, short-term results are often dominated by luck, not skill. While skill remains constant (or, in our investing activity I would hope, modestly improves over time), luck mean reverts. Yet investors tend to extrapolate good recent results into the future, without acknowledging that those short-term results are the result of at most some skill, but at least a lot of luck.
Finally, overconfidence in the ability of investors, or anyone, to predict outcomes in the world and in securities markets. This overconfidence is carefully nurtured by investment firms that give predictions about all manner of world events ranging from the rate of inflation to the probability of war between various states. Many studies, notably by Philip Tetlock, have been carried out on this phenomenon over many years; they find little evidence that even acknowledged experts in a particular field have much skill in forecasting outcomes in that field.

Our investment process is structured to overcome these biases in our own decision-making. We are aware of our source of edge: it lies in assessing the quality of businesses, the sustainability of their cash flows, and estimating the prices at which we may invest or disinvest. We take a long-term approach to investment and try not to react to hourly or daily news cycles.

We try not to make decisions based on forecasts in which we should have little confidence. We are disciplined: adhering to a strong process, structured to be consistent with our investment beliefs, so that we should make the same decision whatever our emotional state of mind.

Importantly, we stick to our area of expertise. We try not to make decisions based on forecasts in which we should have little confidence. We are disciplined: adhering to a strong process, structured to be consistent with our investment beliefs, so that we should make the same decision whatever our emotional state of mind.

Further, we practice diversification, and we limit our permitted exposures to geographies or industries based partly on our assessment of their riskiness. In our International Equity strategy, for example, our exposure is limited to 20% in China, but also to 20% in Switzerland, obviously a much smaller market. Our limit in that strategy to Russia was 10% and 20% in the more limited universe of EM.

This is the process we trust to see ourselves through all market conditions, including when market prices are rapidly falling, whatever the reason for the crisis. When does this approach succeed? Most obviously when prices recover quickly from crises. Correlations of returns tend to increase during crises but revert to normal once they are over. We have seen quick market recoveries after, for example, the 1987 crash; Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait; the Gulf War; the Latin American debt crisis; the Long-Term Capital Management bankruptcy; the Asian financial crisis; the 9-11 attack and closure of the US financial markets; the Global Financial Crisis; and the euro debt crisis.

When does this approach fail? That’s hard to say, as it has yet to do so, at least not over any meaningful time frame. It fails in the short term when unforecastable but very negatively impactful events become more probable and there is a rapid decline in the sentiment of market participants, resulting in sharp declines in asset prices and a rise in their correlation. In the longer term, our approach would fail if there were no recovery in those asset prices. In the case of war breaking out, we note that the long history of US stock markets shows that wars have had little lasting influence on returns. Indeed, since the Great Depression, one of the most prolonged counters to the long-term upward trend in stock prices occurred during 2000–2003, a period that began with overpriced growth stocks and featured the bursting of the internet bubble. This period was also marked by 9-11 and the US invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, yet these events had no sustained impact on markets. As investors, if not as observers of human suffering, we should perhaps worry more about observable stock prices and valuations than about armed conflicts between nations.

How did we approach decisions to invest in Russia? We identified four very strong Russian companies, with good management, strong balance sheets, and excellent growth prospects—each of them also apparently run for the benefit of shareholders with little state interference. We limited our exposure to this risky market (but one lowly correlated with other markets) and implemented our investments through securities traded on exchanges outside Russia. From a portfolio diversification perspective, we held the investments in part as an inflation hedge through the exposure to energy that two of the companies provided, and in part as an antidote to our (now proven to be well-founded) concerns about the valuation risk we saw building in many other parts of the global equity market—knowing full well that the antidote came with geopolitical risk. The trade-offs and decisions we made clearly ended badly, and we deeply regret losses that our clients have suffered. But we must not let hindsight blind us to the difficulty of forecasting such events. Unless and until it’s proven unfounded, we will adhere to a process predicated on the belief that such forecasting is not a source of edge for us (and probably not for anybody) and remain confident that the past is still a reasonable guide to the future…or certainly the best guide we have.

Endnotes

¹Remarks to the New York University Commencement, May 13, 1999.

What did you think of this piece?

Getting Real About Inflation … and Gold

By Edmund Bellord, Analyst and Portfolio Manager | January 08, 2021

As favorable vaccine news piles up, the winds of reflation are stirring. Early signs of an equity market style rotation in favor of cyclical value stocks, a weakening of the safe-haven US dollar, and a run-up in market-derived measures of inflation expectations all point to a resurgence of animal spirits despite a gloomy outlook for the economy. With our monetary maestros promising easy money into the distant future come what may, it is time to spare a thought for what the possible return of higher inflation might do to your portfolio. Inflation is viewed as the bane of fixed income investments, and rightfully so. But inflation can also wreak havoc on stocks. In theory, inflation should have no impact on equities provided companies are able to pass along higher input costs to their customers. In practice, equity valuations are highly sensitive to changes in the price level, tending to plummet when prices jump. No wonder investors are already casting about for inflation protection.

For a vociferous minority, the only bankable hedge for inflation is gold. For them, every spike in the gold price is reproof of government perfidy and foreshadows an inflationary surge. The evidence linking gold’s price and inflation, however, is curiously threadbare. If gold is an unreliable hedge against rising prices, what role, if any, should it play in a portfolio?

Gold as Currency

Gold, having shed its function as a means of exchange and unit of account, is still used as a store of value. Its inflation-hedging bona fides spring from the notion that, unlike other stores of value, it cannot be debased. Central bankers have the power to conjure fiat money at the stroke of a keyboard, but they are powerless when it comes to the quantity of gold. The price of gold may vary from day to day, but with a fixed supply on the order of 250,000 tons, of which one fifth remains lodged in the earth’s crust waiting to be mined, scarcity ensures that over long time spans its purchasing power remains intact. In 1934 an ounce of gold would have set you back US$26; had you buried it in the ground only to dig it up today, 86 years later, it would be worth almost US$2,000. Not a bad return when you consider that a paper dollar lost approximately 99% of its purchasing power in the interim.

But, of course, this simple illustration is dreadfully misleading. It is true that, had you let slip a dollar bill down the back of the couch while resting after burying your gold some 86 years ago, that dollar bill would buy you far fewer goods at the cash register today. Most dollars, however, are not left lying around to gather dust; they are deposited for safekeeping and, until recently, they earned interest. Fairer would be to evaluate gold relative to what you would have earned holding cash on deposit. According to Barro and Misra¹, the long-term compounded return on cash (T-Bills), after accounting for inflation, has been 1% per year, just shy of gold’s 1.1% real return. Gold may have won by a nose, but that extra 10 basis points came at the expense of frequent eye-watering price fluctuations and the occasional sleepless decade.

Echoes of the Gold Standard

It turns out that gold’s reputation as an inflation hedge is really founded on just two episodes: the end of the gold standard and the oil shock of 1979. Between 1971 and 1975 the price of gold quadrupled as the US severed the official link between the US dollar and gold. Again between 1977 and 1980 the price of gold tripled as the inflationary impact of the second oil shock rippled through the entire energy-dependent supply chain. Outside of these two peculiar instances, the relationship between gold and inflation largely falls apart. Remove just the years of 1974, 1979, and 1980, and as we can see the positive correlation between inflation and gold disappears entirely.

Figure 1: Correlation between change in Gold price vs. Inflation 1971-2020

If inflation isn’t driving the gold price, what is? The evidence suggests that a big part of what’s moving gold prices are real interest rates—or the difference between 10-year treasury yields and inflation—whose movements up or down are an important indicator of the underlying state of an economy and its expected growth. This inverse relationship between gold and real rates is born out in the next figure, which shows yearly changes in the price of gold and real interest rates from 1971 to 2020. The large increases in the gold price in 1974, 1979, and 1980, in addition to the price spikes of 2011 and 2020, all occurred against a backdrop of negative real rates. Correspondingly, the gold price declines of the early ’80s coincided with soaring real rates, a consequence of the tight monetary policy enacted during Paul Volker’s chairmanship of the US Federal Reserve.

This relationship between real rates and gold echoes the historical linkages between gold and the US dollar. Under a gold standard, because currency values in terms of gold were fixed, trade imbalances between countries were routinely resolved by a physical flow of gold. Gold would flow into countries that exported more than they imported and had high real exchange and interest rates, and out of countries where the opposite conditions held. But under a fiat system, where currency values in terms of gold are no longer fixed, real interest rates continue to exercise their pull, except now rebalancing occurs with a change in the price of gold instead of a flow. Perhaps because of its ongoing role as a central bank reserve asset and store of value, gold behaves like a shadow currency. A currency where, absent the prospect of a future cashflow, assessing how much to own comes down to what else you could be doing with that fraying dollar bill.

Hedging Inflation: It Depends

Just because gold has kept pace with the price of goods and services does not make it an effective inflation hedge in every scenario. And that’s because the alternate sources of expected inflation—diminished supply versus excess demand—have drastically different implications for real rates and hence for hedging strategies. If you think the world is in the thick of a deflationary or stagflationary bust that will depress real interest rates, then by all means buy gold. The current pandemic, like natural disasters more broadly, can certainly fit the pattern and to the extent it continues to depress consumption could still prove to be one of those kinds of periods. But if you are concerned about monetary excess, adding gold to a portfolio may turn out to be futile and may even magnify risks. If central bankers succeed in reviving inflation by stimulating demand growth, then we should also expect real rates to increase and the gold price to weaken. In that scenario, to hedge inflation you are better off buying TIPS and selling conventional bonds.

It’s only fair to point out that any notional horse race between gold and other assets assumes a functioning financial system nested in a stable society—not an unreasonable assumption for an optimist. But you don’t have to peer too far back in history to find examples of conflict, dispossession and collapse. Beyond keeping up with the price level, part of gold’s appeal lies in its tantalizing potential to ward off financial devastation. Although, if society deteriorates and its ability to function looks dicey, the risk of confiscation also shoots up and your chances of avoiding devastation by holding onto your lump of gold decline precipitously. This makes gold a bit like owning an out-of-the-money put option on social collapse underwritten by an ultimately insolvent counterparty. There is no chance of collecting, but at least its value should rise when people are fearful.

Endnotes

¹Robert Basra and Sanjay Misra, National Bureau of Economic Research, “Gold Returns,” NBER Working Paper Series (February 2013).

What did you think of this piece?

Out of Our Minds

Macro Do’s and Don’ts